In this paper, we prove that both problems for calculating the Banzhaf power index and the Shapley-Shubik power index for weighted ma jority games are NP-complete.
Introduction
Weighted voting is frequently used when there is sucient reason to create or maintain districts which have nontrivial variations in populations. To analyze weighted voting, there is a weighted majority game in the game theory. Banzhaf [1] introduced an index, which is called the Banzhaf power index, for measuring an individual's voting power. Another value concept for measuring voting power was introduced by Shapley and Shubik [8] , which is called the Shapley-Shubik power index. The Shapley-Shubik power index is a special application of a more general value concept introduced by Shapley in [7] .
In this paper, we prove that both problems for calculating the Banzhaf power index and the Shapley-Shubik power index for weighted majority games are N P-complete.
Preliminaries
In this section, we give some denitions and notations. There are n players denoted by f1; : : : ; ng. The weighted majority game is a sequence of nonnegative integers G = (q; w 1 ; w 2 ; : : : ; w n ) satisfying the condition that w i 0 and (1=2) P n i=1 w i < q P n i=1 w i , where each w i denotes the voting weight of player i and the integer q denotes the quota for the game.
A coalition is a subset of players. A coalition S is called a winning coalition (respectively a losing coalition) when P i2S w i q (respectively P i2S w i < q). For any coalition S of players, we say that player i is a swing with respect to S if and only if (S; S4fig) is a pair of a losing coalition and a winning coalition (S 1 4S 2 denotes the symmetric dierence of S 1 and S 2 ). The raw Banzhaf power index denotes the vector = ( 1 ; 2 ; : : : ; n ) such that i is equal to the number of coalitions for which player i is a swing. The Banzhaf power index is the vector 3 = ( 3 1 ; 3 2 ; : : : ; 3 n ) dened by 3
Given a permutation dened on f1; 2; : : : ; ng, we denote (i) by i for each i 2 f1; 2; : : : ; ng. For any permutation on f1; 2; : : : ; ng, we say that player j is the pivot player with respect to if and only if the coalition S = f 1 ; 2 ; : : : ; j01 g satises that S is losing and S [ f j g is winning. The raw Shapley-Shubik power index denotes the vector ' = (' 1 ; ' 2 ; : : : ; ' n ) such that ' i is equal to the number of permutations dened on the set of players for which player i is the pivot player. The Shapley-Shubik power index is the vector ' 3 = (' 3 1 ; ' 3 2 ; : : : ; ' 3 n ) dened by ' 3 i = ' i =n!. If we calculate the Banzhaf power index conforming to an algorithm by the denition, then the algorithm requires O(2 n n)time. Similarly, a naive algorithm for calculating the Shapley-Shubik power index requires O(n!n)time. In 1982, Lucas, Maceli, Hillicard and Housman [5] proposed a pseudo polynomial time algorithm which calculates both the Banzhaf power index and the Shapley-Shubik power index simultaneously. 3 
Banzhaf index
We discuss the problem for calculating the Banzhaf power index. QUESTION: Does the raw Banzhaf power index ( 1 ; : : : ; n ) of the weighted majority game G = (q; w 1 ; : : : ; w n ) satisfy n > 0?
We prove NP-completeness of BZ1 by presenting a polynomial time reduction from the knapsack problem (KP), which is a well-known N P-complete problem [3, 4] . Proof. If problem BZ1 has YES answer, then there exists a coalition for which player n is a swing. The coalition becomes a polynomial size certicate and so problem BZ1 is in the class N P.
Given a problem instance of KP, we construct a problem instance of BZ1 as follows. We put n = k + 1, q = (1=2) P k i=1 a i + 1 and
a i (i = 1; 2; : : : ; n 0 1);
The above denitions imply that the quota q is an integer satisfying
and so G = (q; w 1 ; : : : ; w n ) becomes a weighted majority game.
Assume that n > 0. Then there exists a coalition S 3 such that player n is a swing with respect to S 3 . Without loss of generality, we can assume that S 3 does not contain player n. Since n is a swing with respect to S 3 , The above inequalities and the integrality of weights imply that Clearly from the denition, S = S. We can show easily that if player 2 is a swing with respect to S, then player 1 is a swing with respect to S. It implies that when 1 > 2 , there exists a coalition S 3 such that player 2 is not a swing with respect to S 3 and player 1 is a swing with respect to S 3 . Then the coalition S 3 becomes a polynomial size certicate and so BZ2 is in the class NP.
To show the N P-completeness, we construct the following weighted majority game G 0 from a problem instance of KP. We assume that a 1 a 2 1 1 1 a k . Then we put n = k +2,
(i = 3; 4; : : : ; n);
and q = (3=2)
Clearly from the denition, G 0 = (q; w 1 ; : : : ; w n ) becomes a weighted majority game. Then it is easy to show that 1 > 2 if and only if KP has YES answer.
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The above theorem implies that it is hard to calculate the Banzhaf power index even if we restrict to the players with large index values. Since 1 1=n, we can decide whether 1 > 2 by calculating all the elements of the Banzhaf power index satisfying that corresponding values are greater than or equal to 1=n. Thus, the problem for calculating all the elements of the Banzhaf power index satisfying that corresponding values are greater than or equal to 1=n is NP-hard. 4 
Shapley-Shubik index
We consider the following problem.
SS1
INSTANCE: A positive integer n and a sequence of nonnegative integers (q; w 1 ; : : : ; w n ) satisfying (1=2) P n i=1 w i < q P n i=1 w i and w 1 w 2 1 1 1 w n .
QUESTION: Does the raw Shapley-Shubik power index (' 1 ; : : : ; ' n ) of the weighted majority game G = (q; w 1 ; : : : ; w n ) satisfy ' n > 0?
We prove NP-hardness of SS by presenting a polynomial time reduction from problem KP described in the previous section.
Theorem 3 SS1 is NP-complete.
Proof. Assume that problem SS1 has YES answer. Then there exists a permutation for which player n is the pivot player. The permutation becomes a polynomial size certicate and so problem SS1 is in the class NP.
For any problem instance of KP ; we construct the weighted majority game G with n = k + 1 players dened in the proof of Theorem 1. The above inequalities and the integrality of weights imply that P i2S a i = q01 = (1=2) P k i=1 a i , and so KP has YES answer.
Next, we consider the case that there exists a subset S f1; 2; : : : ; kg satisfying that P i2S a i = (1=2) P k i=1 a i . Let be a permutation satisfying the condition that there exists an integer i such that i = n and S = f 1 ; 2 ; : : : ; i01 g. Then, it is clear that player n = i is the pivot player with respect to and so ' n > 0.
2
The above theorem directly implies the following.
Corollary 2 Calculating the Shapley-Shubik power index is N P-hard.
When we are interested in the players with large voting weights, we need to consider the following problem. Proof. For any permutation , denotes the permutation obtained from by exchanging the positions of player 1 and player 2. Clearly from the denition, () = . We can show easily that if player 2 is the pivot player with respect to , then player 1 is the pivot player with respect to . It implies that when ' 1 > ' 2 , there exists a permutation 3 such that player 2 is not the pivot player with respect to 3 and player 1 is the pivot player with respect to 3 . Then the permutation 3 becomes a polynomial size certicate and so SS2 is in the class NP.
To show the NP-completeness, we construct the weighted majority game G 0 dened in Theorem 2. Then it is easy to show that ' 1 > ' 2 if and only if KP has YES answer.
The above corollary implies that it is hard to calculate the Shapley-Shubik power index even if we restrict to the players with large index values. The problem for calculating all the elements of the Shapley-Shubik power index satisfying that corresponding values are greater than or equal to 1=n is also NP-hard.
